

No. _____

In the Supreme Court of the United States

Dennis Jones,
Petitioner

v.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Respondent

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Single Justice for the County of Suffolk

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

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Question Presented

Does the Fifth Amendment's act of production doctrine apply to compelled decryption? If so, what does the foregone conclusion exception to the act of production doctrine require the government to show before an order to compel decryption can issue?

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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Petitioner Dennis Jones respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk in *Commonwealth v. Jones*, No. SJ-2018-0221.

Opinions Below

The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that compelled the judgement of the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk is reported at 481 Mass. 540, 117 N.E.3d 720.

Jurisdiction

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk entered a judgement on May 10, 2019. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

Relevant Constitutional Provision

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: “No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...”

Statement of the Case

Jones was indicted on charges of trafficking a person for sexual servitude in violation of Massachusetts G.L. c. 265, § 50(a), and deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute in violation of Massachusetts G.L. c. 272, § 7. At the time of his arrest, police found two phones on Jones person. The complainant, Jones’s former girlfriend, alleged Jones used two mobile phone numbers to communicate with her. She labelled these phone numbers Jones’s business phone and his personal

phone. The complainant alleged Jones used his business phone number to facilitate the provision of sexual services for money. She claimed Jones would use the business number to communicate with her and potential customers to facilitate meetings where customers would pay the petitioner for sexual services. Police confirmed one of the phones found on Jones at the time of his arrest corresponded to the number the complainant alleged Jones used as his business phone.

The complainant voluntarily provided her phone to the police. The police conducted a forensic analysis of her phone and discovered a number of communications between the complainant and the business phone number. The Commonwealth alleged some of these communications concerned Jones's prostitution enterprise. The communications included screen shots of hotel reservation confirmations and conversations about servicing the complainant's clients.

Nine days after Jones's arrest, a detective from the Woburn, Massachusetts Police Department applied for a warrant to search the phone associated with the business number. The police requested permission to search the contents of the phone – all contacts, calendar entries, files, photographs, videos, caller-ids, text messages, voice mails, email messages, and other materials - to corroborate the complainant's statements and to identify the "regular user of the phone." A search warrant for the phone issued but the police were unable to search the phone because it was encrypted. The phone could only be decrypted with the entry of a passcode.

After the petitioner was indicted, the Commonwealth filed a motion in the Massachusetts Superior Court seeking a court order requiring Jones to unlock the

phone it seized from him at the time of his arrest. The central legal issue of the Commonwealth's motion was whether compelling the defendant to enter the password to the phone would violate his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Commonwealth claimed that under *Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt*, 468 Mass. 512, 520-526 (2014), the act of entering the password was not testimonial because the defendant's knowledge of the passcode was known to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth argued the defendant's knowledge of the passcode was therefore a foregone conclusion rendering his entry of the passcode a non-testimonial act. The defendant claimed the Commonwealth's proposed order to compel him to enter the passcode and produce the contents of the phone violated his right against self-incrimination under both the Fifth Amendment and Article 12. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing.

Several months later, the Commonwealth sought the issuance of an additional search warrant for the business phone. This time the Commonwealth requested a warrant to perform a "chip off procedure." During a chip off procedure information can be retrieved directly from a phone's memory circuit or chip. During the procedure, the memory chip or circuit is removed. After removal, the memory of the device can be examined and retrieved without the need for a passcode. When the court directed the application for the warrant to the same judge who denied the motion to compel the passcode, the Commonwealth elected to withdraw the warrant application. It then sought reconsideration of the motion to compel the passcode.

The Commonwealth presented additional information to support its claim the defendant's knowledge of the passcode was a foregone conclusion. This information included subscriber information for the business phone, cell-site location data and a police report of a prior incident during which Jones allegedly provided the police with the business phone number as one of his contact numbers. The Commonwealth argued this new information coupled with the material submitted with its prior filings was sufficient to prove Jones owned the phone and, inferentially, knew the passcode. The defendant again claimed the Commonwealth's proposed order to compel him to enter the passcode and produce the contents of the phone violated his right against self-incrimination under both the Fifth Amendment and Article 12 and the new material produced by the Commonwealth added nothing. The reconsideration motion was denied by the trial court.

The Commonwealth then filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the Single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk pursuant to Massachusetts G.L. c. 211, § 3 (docket number SJ-2018-0221). The Single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk is a distinct court from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court with original jurisdiction conferred by the Massachusetts Constitution. The Single Justice reserved and reported the case for determination by the Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth. The parties were ordered to address whether the Commonwealth established the defendant's knowledge of the passcode was a foregone conclusion as that term was used in

Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 520-526 (2014) in their briefs to the Supreme Judicial Court.

After the reservation and report, the case was entered in the Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth (docket number SJC-12564). After briefing and oral argument, the Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision on March 6, 2019. The court recognized an act of production is a testimonial act under both the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in accordance with this court's decision in *Fisher*. Following *Fisher*, the Supreme Judicial Court noted an act of production may be compelled without violating the Fifth Amendment of the United States where "facts conveyed [by the act] are already known to the government" and the act adds little to the government's information. The court noted this was the essence of the foregone conclusion doctrine. In the context of compelled decryption, the court concluded the only fact conveyed by compelling a defendant to enter a passcode is that the defendant knows the passcode and can access the device. The court then concluded that to compel decryption of an electronic device, the Commonwealth must establish a defendant knows the passcode to decrypt the device before knowledge of the passcode can be deemed a foregone conclusion under the Fifth Amendment.

After establishing the application of the act of production doctrine and foregone conclusion exception applied to encrypted devices, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed their application to Jones. Determining it has traditionally considered Article 12 to be more protective of the right against self-incrimination than the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Judicial Court considered whether the

order to compel decryption would violate Article 12. Ultimately, the court determined since the Commonwealth proved Jones knew the passcode, he could be compelled by a court order to enter the passcode without violating Article 12.

The Supreme Judicial remanded the case back to the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk for entry of a judgement both reversing the denial of the Commonwealth's renewed motion to compel production of the passcode and remanding the matter to the Superior Court for an entry of an order compelling Jones to enter his password into the business phone. On May 10, 2019, the Supreme Judicial Court for County of Suffolk entered a judgement ordering the Superior Court to enter an order compelling Jones to enter the passcode to the business phone.¹

Reasons for Granting the Writ

- 1. Although lower courts almost unanimously agree the decryption of an encrypted device in response to a court order is a testimonial act of production under the Fifth Amendment, they are divided on what is produced by an order to compel decryption and the application of the forgone conclusion exception to the act of production.**

American society has become increasingly reliant on digital technology to navigate daily life. This reliance has made digital technology invaluable but also a source of vulnerability. Encryption technology is often employed to protect the information found on digital devices, including mobile phones. Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, *Encryption Workarounds*, 106 *Geo. L.J.* 989, 990 (2018). Encryption technology renders the materials unreadable until a code or decryption

¹ After remand, the trial court ordered Jones to enter his passcode. After re-asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege, Jones used a passcode to decrypt the phone in accordance with the court order.

key is entered. *Id* at 993-994. Law enforcement is not immune from reliance on digital technology and applications for warrants to search a digital device have become routine aspects of a criminal investigation. When the device is encrypted, the government may request an order to compel the decryption of the device to effectuate the search.

An order to compel a defendant to produce documents implicates the Fifth Amendment. *Fisher v. United States*, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). This court originally interpreted the Fifth Amendment as affording protection to all private papers. *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). *Fisher v. United States* changed that understanding. In *Fisher*, the government sought production of tax records. *Fisher*, 425 U.S. at 394-395. Fisher claimed the Fifth Amendment protected against disclosure of the records. *Id* at 395. When addressing the Fifth Amendment claim in *Fisher* this Court rejected the holding in *Boyd* that the Fifth Amendment protected all personal papers and documents. *Id* at 407-409. The court reasoned because Fisher's tax records existed at the time of the subpoena was issued, the papers themselves were not testimonial because they were not created in response to the subpoena. *Id* at 409-410. Although *Fisher* rescinded blanket Fifth Amendment protection for private papers, it held the act of producing documents in response to the subpoena could be testimonial if the act of production used the contents of the mind and conceded, either explicitly or implicitly, the existence, possession and control, or authenticity of the documents. *Id* at 408-414. This Court's holding in *Fisher* became known as the act of production doctrine.

But *Fisher* did not immunize all documents from production. The court provided an exception to the act of production doctrine. If the government can demonstrate the existence, possession or control, and authenticity of the identified documents or materials it seeks is a foregone conclusion, then the act of production adds little to the government's information because the government is not relying on the veracity of the statement implicit in the act of production to prove the existence, possession or control or authenticity of the documents. *Fisher*, 425 U.S. at 410-411. This court further clarified the foregone conclusion exception to the act of production in *United States v. Hubbell*. Although *Hubbell* did not define the parameters of the foregone conclusion exception more specifically than *Fisher*, it noted the government needed to independently confirm the existence, authenticity, and possession or custody of the materials sought for the foregone conclusion exception to apply. *United States v. Hubbell*, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000). The burden rests on the government to prove independent knowledge of the documents to be produced. It cannot make up for any deficiencies in its showing by offering generalizations that the materials would typically be possessed by an individual. *Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 38.

Almost all lower courts who have addressed orders to compel decryption have agreed the entry of a passcode or encryption key is an act of production. *See, e.g. United States v. Apple MacPro Computer*, 851 F.3d 238 (3rd Cir. 2017); *In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum*, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012); *United States v. Kirschner*, 823 F.Supp.2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010); *Seo v. State*, 190 N.E. 3rd 418 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer granted, opinion vacated, 119 N.E. 3rd 90 (Ind. 2018). The

entry of a passcode involves the use of the mind and concedes the existence, possession or control, and authenticity of the materials or documents sought by the government. Orin S. Kerr, *Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination*, 97 Texas L. 767, 779-782 (2019). While there is relative unanimity over whether the act of production applies to compelled decryption, there is a split among lower courts over the question of what is produced by a decryption order and, relatedly, what the government must prove to establish the foregone conclusion exception. This split nominally centers on the question of what is produced by an order to decrypt. One side of this split views an order to decrypt as compelling the production of the documents and materials on the decrypted device. *See, e.g., In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum*, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012); *G.A.Q.L. v. State*, 257 So.3d 1058, 1063-1064 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); *Seo v. State*, 190 N.E. 3rd 418 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer granted, opinion vacated, 119 N.E. 3rd 90 (Ind. 2018). The other side of the split holds a decryption order seeks only the passcode itself. *See, e.g., United States v. Spencer*, No. 17 CR 289, 2018 WL 1964588 (N.D. Cal. April 26, 2018); *United States v. Apple MacPro Computer*, 851 F.3d 238 (3rd Cir. 2017); *State v. Stahl*, 206 So.3d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). The decision of the SJC here falls into this second group. *Commonwealth v. Jones*, 481 Mass. 540, 548 (2019).

- 2. Because the act of decryption provides access to the contents of the device, the act of production doctrine requires that the government identify with reasonable particularity the files, documents, or items that it seeks from an encrypted device before decryption can be compelled.**

An order to compel decryption is typically the means by which the government accesses the contents of an encrypted device. Like a subpoena to produce records, the order to compel the entry of the passcode is the legal means by which the government forces a defendant to produce the material it seeks. When a person enters a passcode into her phone or other encrypted device, she makes the entire contents of her phone available. Laurent Sacharoff, *Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices*, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 203, 221-222 (2018). The contents are unreadable prior to the entry of the passcode. The passcode is only the means through which the contents of the device are produced. Because it is the contents of the encrypted device and not the passcode that are produced in response to an order to compel decryption, the tenets of the act of production doctrine are best served by requiring the government to identify with reasonable particularity the material sought from the encrypted device before an order to decrypt can issue. *See In Re Grand Jury Subpoena*, 670 F.3d at 1347-1352.

The testimonial nature of the act of production doctrine rests on inferences. When a person produces documents in response to a subpoena, her actions infer that the documents requested exist, that she has possession or control of the documents and they are authentic. *See Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 36-37 (2000). If that same person enters a passcode into an encrypted device, her act creates an inference she knows the passcode to the device and can access it. But it also creates an inference she owns the device and has possession and knowledge of its contents. *See* Laurent Sacharoff, *What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Professor Kerr*, 97 Texas L. Rev. Online 1, 5-11 (Feb. 1, 2019).

Because the testimonial nature of the act of production arises from the inferences generated by that act of production, the doctrine requires the government prove that it already has sufficient information to generate those very inferences before the foregone conclusion exception is applicable. *See Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 44-45 (2000). In other words, the government must be able to provide an independent source for any inference that would be generated by the act of production before the foregone conclusion exception applies. *Id.*

When applied to orders to compel decryption of a phone, the act of production doctrine requires that the government must identify the specific content located on the phone before the foregone conclusion exception is triggered allowing the compelled production of the contents of the device. Entry of the passcode says more than “I know the passcode.” It infers possession of the myriad pictures, texts, videos, emails and other documents contained on the phone. If the government cannot demonstrate it already knows everything the act of production will reveal, the decryption of the device cannot be compelled consonant with the Fifth Amendment. Limiting consideration of the act of production doctrine and foregone conclusion exception to the passcode alone, as the Supreme Judicial Court did here, results in the compulsion of a communication without the assurance that the government has a source for that communication aside from the compelled production. *See Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 38 (2000).

Requiring the government to identify with reasonable particularity the documents or other materials it seeks before an order of decryption may be issued also preserves the uniform application of the act of production doctrine and the

foregone conclusion exception. If, as the Supreme Judicial Court held, the act of production doctrine and the foregone conclusion exception only require the government to demonstrate a defendant knows the passcode before decryption can be compelled, the standards applied to the production of paper documents and documents from an encrypted device are different. If the government were to issue a subpoena requesting the production of a paper copy of an email or picture, the act of production doctrine requires the government demonstrate it knows of the existence, location and authenticity of the email or picture before the defendant can be compelled to produce them. However, if the government sought the same email or picture from an encrypted device, it would only need to demonstrate the defendant knows the passcode to the device. The government's burden would be lower for an encrypted device because it would not need to identify the email or picture for an order to compel to issue. Advances in digital technology should not lessen the government's burden. *See Carpenter v. United States*, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217-2219, 2222 (2018).

3. Although the prosecution of Jones has yet to be resolved in the Massachusetts courts, this court has jurisdiction because the Fifth Amendment issue has been finally decided and Jones cannot obtain further review of that claim in the Massachusetts's courts.

This Court has jurisdiction to address this petition because the Supreme Judicial Court's decision is final regarding the order to decrypt. For a state court judgement to be final and reviewable in this court, it cannot be subject to any further review in a state court and the judgement must be an effective determination of the litigation. *See also Market St. Ry Co. v. Railroad Commission of State of California*, 342 U.S. 548, 551 (1945) (For the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction the state court

judgement “must be the final word of the final court.”). A case is final for jurisdictional purposes if the state court judgement conclusively disposes of a matter distinct from the general subject of the litigation and effects only the parties to the controversy. *Clark v. Willard*, 292 U.S. 112, 117-119 (1934). While state law may be relied upon by this court to determine if the judgement is final, the decision whether the court has jurisdiction under §1257(a) is for this court to decide. *Burns v. Ohio*, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); *Cotton v. Hawaii*, 211 U.S. 162, 170-171 (1908). A state court judgement can be final even though there are further proceedings on the merits where the federal claim has been finally decided and there is no possibility for further review in the state courts. *See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn*, 420 U.S. 469, 481-482 (1975).

After the Commonwealth’s motion to compel decryption was denied, it brought a Petition for Extraordinary Relief to the Single Justice for Suffolk County pursuant to Massachusetts G.L. c. 211, § 3. That statute grants the Supreme Judicial Court general superintendence of the lower courts. Relief under c. 211, § 3 is an extraordinary remedy meant for situations where a litigant has no alternative remedy. *McMeninmen v. Passatempo*, 452 Mass. 178, 190 (2008). The petition for relief is essentially a complaint filed with the Single Justice for Suffolk County that is separate from the underlying legal action. *Id* at 191. (“An action seeking relief under c. 211, § 3 is a new and separate civil action in the county court.”) It is not an interlocutory appeal. The Single Justice may act on the petition or may report the issue to the Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth. If the Single Justice acts on the petition without reporting it and enters a judgement, that judgement is

appealable as a matter of right. *McMenimen*, 452 Mass. at 191. If the Single Justice reports the petition to the full bench, judgement is not entered until after the Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth issues its decision. The judgement that is entered in the county court following the decision of the full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court is a final judgement that is not subject to further review in any Massachusetts court. *See McMenimen*, 452 Mass. at 191. As was the case here, the judgment in the Single Justice session consists of an order to the trial court instructing it how to proceed.

Jones cannot obtain further review in the Massachusetts courts of his Federal constitutional claim if he is ultimately convicted because Massachusetts state law prevents him from presenting his claims on review. The judgement of the Single Justice is the final determination in Massachusetts regarding whether the Fifth Amendment precludes the issuance of an order for Jones to decrypt the phone. Because there is no further avenue for review of Jones's Fifth Amendment claim, this court has jurisdiction to entertain this petition regardless of the continuing action in the Massachusetts' trial court. *See Cox Broadcasting Corp.*, 420 U.S. at 481-482.

Conclusion

The order to compel decryption here violated the Fifth Amendment because the act of production it required was testimonial. The Commonwealth failed to meet its burden under the foregone conclusion exception because it did not identify with reasonable particularity any documents contained on the phone. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court misapplied the act of production doctrine and foregone

conclusion exception when it determined the passcode was the thing produced by the order of production.

This court has jurisdiction because Jones cannot obtain further review of the Fifth Amendment question in the Massachusetts's courts.

Jones requests this court grant his petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

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Appendix A

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-12564

COMMONWEALTH vs. DENNIS JONES.

Suffolk. November 6, 2018. - March 6, 2019.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

Cellular Telephone. Witness, Compelling giving of evidence, Self-incrimination. Constitutional Law, Self-incrimination.

Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 17, 2018.

The case was reported by Gants, C.J.

Gabriel Pell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

James A. Reidy (George F. Ohlson, Jr., also present) for the defendant.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Andrew Levchuk & Lauren C. Ostberg for Orin S. Kerr.

David Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services.

Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Randall E. Ravitz, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.

Laurent Sacharoff, pro se.

KAFKER, J. A grand jury returned indictments charging the defendant, Dennis Jones, with trafficking a person for sexual servitude, G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), and deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute, G. L. c. 272, § 7. At the time of his arrest, the Commonwealth seized a cell phone from the defendant. During its investigation of the defendant, the Commonwealth developed information leading it to believe that the contents of the cell phone included material and inculpatory evidence. The Commonwealth thereafter applied for and was granted a search warrant to search the cell phone. The search warrant has yet to be executed, however, as the Commonwealth was -- and currently remains -- unable to access the cell phone's contents because they are encrypted. The contents can only be decrypted with the entry of a password.¹

The Commonwealth sought to compel the defendant to decrypt the cell phone by filing a motion for an order requiring the defendant to produce a personal identification number access code in the Superior Court. The central legal issue concerned whether compelling the defendant to enter the password to the

¹ We understand the word "password" to be synonymous with other terms that cell phone users may be familiar with, such as Personal Identification Number or "passcode." Each term refers to the personalized combination of letters or digits that, when manually entered by the user, "unlocks" a cell phone. For simplicity, we use "password" throughout. See generally, Kerr & Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 Geo. L.J. 989, 990, 994, 998 (2018).

cell phone would violate his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Commonwealth argued that under our decision in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512 (2014), the act of entering the password would not amount to self-incrimination because the defendant's knowledge of the password was already known to the Commonwealth, and was therefore a "foregone conclusion" under the Fifth Amendment and art. 12. Following a hearing, a judge denied the Commonwealth's motion, concluding that the Commonwealth had not proved that the defendant's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion under the Fifth Amendment.

Several months later, the Commonwealth renewed its motion and included additional factual information that it had not set forth in its initial motion. The judge denied the renewed motion, noting that because the additional information was known or reasonably available to the Commonwealth when the initial motion was filed, he was "not inclined" to consider the renewed motion under the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure. The judge concluded that even if he were to consider the renewed motion, the Commonwealth had still failed to prove that the defendant's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion.

The Commonwealth then filed a petition for relief in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3; the single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court. The single justice asked the parties to address three specific issues, in addition to any other questions they thought relevant. Those issues are the following:

"1. What is the burden of proof that the Commonwealth bears on a motion like this in order to establish a 'foregone conclusion,' as that term is used in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 520-526 (2014)?

"2. Did the Commonwealth meet its burden of proof in this case?

"3. When a judge denies a 'Gelfgatt' motion filed by the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth thereafter renews its motion and provides additional supporting information that it had not provided in support of the motion initially, is a judge acting on the renewed motion first required to find that the additional information was not known or reasonably available to the Commonwealth when the earlier motion was filed before considering the additional information?"

We conclude that when the Commonwealth seeks an order pursuant to our decision in Gelfgatt (Gelfgatt order or motion) compelling a defendant to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, art. 12 requires the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant knows the password beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception to apply. We also conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden in this case. Finally, we conclude that a judge acting on a renewed Gelfgatt motion may consider additional information without first finding

that it was not known or not reasonably available to the Commonwealth at the time the earlier Gelfgatt motion was filed.

We therefore reverse the judge's denial of the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion, and we remand the case to the Superior Court for entry of an order compelling the defendant to enter the password into the cell phone at issue.²

Background. The relevant undisputed facts are taken from the parties' submissions to the motion judge.³ See Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 514.

1. The investigation and the defendant's arrest. In December 2016, the police responded to a report of a stolen purse at a hotel in Woburn. Upon arriving, the woman whose purse was stolen, Sara,⁴ identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the theft. She explained that she knew the defendant because she had met him through an online dating website a few weeks earlier. Sara eventually disclosed that

² We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Committee for Public Counsel Services, and Professor Orin S. Kerr. We also acknowledge the amicus submission of Professor Laurent Sacharoff.

³ These submissions included the Commonwealth's initial search warrant application, and exhibits attached thereto; various affidavits of law enforcement officers, and exhibits attached thereto. The motion judge did not hear testimony from any witnesses or make any credibility findings. He denied the motion based on the documentary record.

⁴ A pseudonym. See G. L. c. 265 § 24C.

although she had initially believed that she and the defendant were dating, the defendant soon induced her into working as a prostitute in exchange for housing. Based on this information, the police began investigating the defendant.

During their investigation, police linked a cell phone, later determined to be an LG brand cell phone (LG phone), to the defendant. Sara stated that she communicated with the defendant by contacting the LG phone. Specifically, she "talk[ed] on the phone and [exchanged] text messag[es] with [the defendant]" while he used the LG phone. Additionally, the LG phone's telephone number was listed in the contacts section of Sara's cell phone as "[]Dennis."

Sara told police that the LG phone was used by the defendant and a female associate to conduct prostitution. Specifically, Sara explained that the defendant would regularly respond to customer text messages by using the LG phone, but that his female associate would answer telephone calls from customers so that the customers would hear a "female voice." Additionally, an examination of Sara's cell phone revealed several communications between her phone and the LG phone related to prostitution, including screenshots of customer communications sent to the LG phone in response to online advertisements seeking to arrange prostitution transactions with Sara; messages from the LG phone explicitly instructing Sara on

how to perform sexual acts on customers; messages from the LG phone trying to convince Sara to return to the defendant after she had attempted to flee from him out of fear; and messages from the LG phone apologizing for the defendant's behavior. Police also discovered several Internet postings on the website Backpage.com advertising Sara as an escort that listed the telephone number of the LG phone as the principal point of contact for customers seeking to engage in a prostitution transaction with her.

The police arrested the defendant shortly after commencing their investigation. At the time of the arrest, the police recovered two cell phones in his possession, one of which was the LG phone. The LG phone was found in the defendant's pants pocket.

Soon after the arrest, the police applied for a search warrant to perform a forensic search of the LG phone. The application was granted. The police thereafter attempted to execute the search warrant, but discovered that its contents were encrypted such that they could be accessed only after the entry of a password to unlock, and thereby decrypt, the cell phone.⁵ The police determined that they did not have the

⁵ We recognize that ordinary cell phone users are likely unfamiliar with the complexities of encryption technology. For instance, although entering a password "unlocks" a cell phone, the password itself is not the "encryption key" that decrypts

technological capability to bypass the lock function without the entry of the password and were therefore unable to execute the search warrant.

2. The Commonwealth's Gelfgatt motions. As discussed supra, the Commonwealth filed a Gelfgatt motion seeking a court order compelling the defendant to decrypt the LG phone by entering its password. The Commonwealth argued that compelling the defendant to enter the password would not force him to incriminate himself because the act itself would not reveal any information that the Commonwealth did not already know. Following a hearing, a judge denied the motion, concluding that because the Commonwealth had failed to "demonstrate[] with reasonable particularity that [the defendant] possesses the [password] for the LG phone," the defendant's knowledge of the password was not a foregone conclusion under the Fifth Amendment.

When the Commonwealth renewed its motion, it presented additional factual information that it argued proved that the

the cell phone's contents. See Kerr & Schneier, supra at 995. Rather, "entering the [password] decrypts the [encryption] key, enabling the key to be processed and unlocking the phone. This two-stage process is invisible to the casual user." Id. Because the technical details of encryption technology do not play a role in our analysis, they are not worth belaboring. Accordingly, we treat the entry of a password as effectively decrypting the contents of a cell phone. For a more detailed discussion of encryption technology, see generally Kerr & Schneier, supra.

defendant's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion, including the LG phone's subscriber information that tended to link the defendant to the LG phone, subsets of the LG phone's cell site location information (CSLI) records, and a prior statement the defendant had made to police during his booking in an unrelated criminal matter in which he identified the LG phone as his telephone number. The judge denied the renewed motion.

The Commonwealth filed a petition for relief in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. The single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court, asking the parties to address the three questions quoted supra.

Discussion. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Similarly, art. 12 provides that "[n]o subject shall . . . be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." Accordingly, it is a "fundamental principle of our system of justice" that a person enjoys the "right to be free from self-incrimination" under the Fifth Amendment and art. 12. Commonwealth v. Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 455 (1983).

The privilege against self-incrimination applies when the "accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). See Commonwealth v. Burgess, 426 Mass. 206, 218 (1997). Testimonial communications are not limited to spoken words or

written statements, however, as the act of producing information "demanded by the government may have 'communicative aspects' that would render the Fifth Amendment" and art. 12 applicable. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 520, quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. "Whether an act of production is testimonial depends on whether the government compels the individual to disclose the contents of his [or her] own mind to explicitly or implicitly communicate some statement of fact" (quotations and citation omitted).⁶ Gelfgatt, supra at 520. See id. at 525-526 ("Where the information conveyed by an act of production is reflective of the knowledge, understanding, and thoughts of the witness, it is deemed to be testimonial and, therefore, within the purview of art. 12" [quotations and citation omitted]).

The Commonwealth may, however, compel testimonial acts of production without violating a defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment or art. 12 where the "facts conveyed [by the act] already are known to the government, such that the

⁶ For example, the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated when the government seeks "to compel an individual to be the source of real or physical evidence by, for example," furnishing a blood sample, taking a breathalyzer test, producing a voice exemplar, providing a handwriting exemplar, standing in a lineup, or putting on particular clothing. Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 521 (2014), and cases cited. In these circumstances, the conduct is not testimonial because the "the individual is not required to disclose any knowledge he [or she] might have or to speak his [or her] guilt" (quotations and citation omitted). Id. at 521.

individual 'adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information.'" Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 522, quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. In these circumstances, because the facts implicitly disclosed through the act of production are already known to the Commonwealth, they are considered a "foregone conclusion" and do not force a defendant to incriminate himself or herself. Gelfgatt, supra at 522-523, 525-526.

Although the foregone conclusion exception originated in the context of the compelled production of documents in response to a government subpoena, see Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411, we extended its application to the compelled production of passwords to encrypted electronic devices in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 522-525.⁷ In Gelfgatt, the defendant was an attorney who was alleged to have, "through his use of computers, conducted a sophisticated scheme of diverting to himself funds that were intended to be used to pay off large mortgage loans." Id. at 513. The files located on four computers seized from the defendant, however, were encrypted and

⁷ Several other courts have done the same. See, e.g., United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 247-248 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1344-1345 (11th Cir. 2012) (Subpoena Duces Tecum); United States vs. Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 26, 2018); State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 135-137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).

were thus inaccessible to the Commonwealth without the entry of a password to decrypt them. Id. at 516-517. We concluded that compelling the defendant to decrypt the files by entering the passwords into the computers could be a testimonial act of production under the Fifth Amendment and art. 12. Id. at 522, 525-526. Nonetheless, we held that "[t]he facts that would be conveyed by the defendant through his act of decryption . . . already [were] known to the [Commonwealth] and, thus, [were] a 'foregone conclusion.'"⁸ Id. at 524. We therefore held that the Commonwealth's motion to compel decryption did not violate either the Fifth Amendment or art. 12. Id. at 524, 525. See id. at 523 (because facts conveyed by act of decryption were foregone conclusion, "the act of decryption is not a testimonial communication that is protected" by Fifth Amendment or art. 12).

⁸ In Gelfgatt, we noted that by entering the passwords, the defendant implicitly conveyed the fact that he knew the computers were encrypted, that he knew the passwords to decrypt the computers, and that he had "ownership and control of the computers and their contents." Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 524. Although correctly describing the facts in Gelfgatt, we clarify today that the entry of a password alone does not convey the fact of "ownership" of the device or its contents. Id. Whether entry of a password indicates control also is unclear. Indeed, individuals may very well know the password to an electronic device that is owned and controlled by another person. For example, family members and significant others routinely know the passwords to each other's cell phones, and students are regularly given passwords to school-owned computers. The fact of knowledge of a password is distinct from the ownership or control of the device and its contents.

Accordingly, for the foregone conclusion exception to apply, the Commonwealth must establish that it already knows the testimony that is implicit in the act of the required production. Id. at 522-523. In the context of compelled decryption, the only fact conveyed by compelling a defendant to enter the password to an encrypted electronic device is that the defendant knows the password, and can therefore access the device.⁹ See id. See also Kerr, *Compelled Decryption and the*

⁹The Commonwealth's Gelfgatt motions in this case requested that the defendant "produce" or "provide" the password to the LG phone. Although it is not perfectly clear what the Commonwealth meant by "produce" or "provide," its proposed order suggested that it sought to require the defendant to make a written disclosure of the actual password to the LG phone. There is some debate among courts and commenters as to whether the foregone conclusion exception can apply in cases where the government seeks to compel the defendant to disclose -- whether orally or in writing -- the actual password, as opposed to cases requiring merely physically entering it into the device. Compare Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 134 (password itself has no "testimonial significance" and thus may be compelled [citation omitted]), with Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1 ("the government could not compel Spencer to state the password itself, whether orally or in writing"), and Sacharoff, *Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices*, 87 *Fordham L. Rev.* 203, 236 (2018) ("It is a mistake to apply the foregone conclusion doctrine to the oral disclosure of a password"). See generally Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988) (compelling someone to reveal combination to wall safe, as opposed to merely surrender key to strong box, is testimonial). There is some support for the idea that the written disclosure of the password would amount to direct testimony, not an act of production, and that the foregone conclusion exception is limited only to acts of production. 3 W.R. LaFave, J.H. Israel, N.J. King, & O.S. Kerr, *Criminal Procedure* § 8.13(a) (4th ed. 2015) ("requir[ing] a party to reveal a pass[word] that would allow [the government] to perform the decryption . . . would require a testimonial communication

Privilege Against Self-incrimination, Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 18) ("the only assertion implied by entering the password is that the person compelled knows the password"). The Commonwealth must therefore establish that a defendant knows the password to decrypt an electronic device before his or her knowledge of the password can be deemed a foregone conclusion under the Fifth Amendment or art. 12.¹⁰

standing apart from the act of production, and therefore make unavailable the foregone conclusion doctrine"). We need not, and do not, resolve this distinction here, and our decision is therefore limited to only the physical entry of the password by the defendant, as we required in Gelfgatt. The defendant may therefore only be compelled to enter the password to the LG phone, not disclose it.

¹⁰ The motion judge interpreted our decision in Gelfgatt to require that the Commonwealth establish "(1) the existence of the evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of that evidence by the defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the evidence." What the motion judge meant by evidence in this context is not particularly clear, nor were we as clear as we might have been in our analysis in Gelfgatt. We clarify that the evidence at issue in the compelled decryption here is the password itself, not the contents of the phone.

As we explained supra, the only testimony that would be conveyed by compelling the defendant to enter the password is the fact that the defendant knows the password, and therefore has the ability to access the phone. The entry would convey no information about the contents of the LG phone. See Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 136 ("The question is not the State's knowledge of the contents of the phone; the State has not requested the contents of the phone"). The analysis would be different had the Commonwealth sought to compel the defendant to produce specific files located in the contents of the LG phone. If that had been the case, the production of the files would implicitly convey far more information than just the fact that the defendant knows the password. See Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1347, 1349. The defendant's production of specific files would implicitly

With this analytical framework in mind, we turn now to the reported questions.¹¹

testify to the existence of the files, his control over them, and their authenticity. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 n.19 (2000) ("by producing documents in compliance with a subpoena, the witness would admit that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were authentic"). Accordingly, the Commonwealth would be required to prove its prior knowledge of those facts.

¹¹ The concurrence suggests that in addition to proving the defendant's knowledge of the password, the government must also demonstrate that it "already knows, with reasonable particularity, the existence and location of relevant, incriminating evidence it expects to find on that device." Post at . Without this added requirement, the concurrence argues, the government may obtain "unlimited . . . access," post at note 4, to a "trove of potential incriminating and highly personal data on an electronic device" by proving only "that the accused knows the device's pass[word]," post at . This is not correct.

It is well established that under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the police are ordinarily required to obtain a search warrant before a search of the contents of an electronic device may take place. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (cell phones); Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 477 Mass. 588, 594 (2017) (digital cameras); Commonwealth v. McDermott, 448 Mass. 750, 776, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 910 (2007) (computers). Accordingly, in this case, the police were required to obtain a warrant before they could seek to search the contents of the LG phone, and they did so. The full protections against improper searches -- probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that evidence of the crime would be found on the device -- were required and, in the opinion of the clerk-magistrate who issued the search warrant, were satisfied here. The standard proposed by the concurrence conflates these protections with the protections afforded by art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Our task under art. 12 in this context is to determine only what facts are conveyed to the government when a defendant is compelled to enter a password to decrypt an electronic device. As we have explained, the only fact conveyed by the physical act of

entering the password into an electronic device is that the defendant knows the password. Such an act says nothing about the contents of the device. Nor does the act alone "produce" any evidence to the Commonwealth. Post at note 1.

Accordingly, under these circumstances, the Commonwealth was required to abide by two sets of constitutional protections. Requiring this dual protection does not, as the concurrence contends, sound a "death knell" of constitutional protection in the digital age. Post at . Nor do we read the two constitutional protections in "splendid isolation." Post at note 1. Each has its own purpose, function, and requirements, and they work together to form a double protection of digital privacy before particular files on the phone can be accessed.

Moreover, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals cited by the concurrence in support of its proposed standard do not support its application to cases where, as here, the government seeks only to compel the entry of the password to an electronic device. Post at . For example, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Subpoena Duces Tecum was a case where the government "served [the defendant] with a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to . . . produce the unencrypted contents located on the hard drives of . . . laptop computers and five external hard drives" (emphasis added). Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1337. There, the government sought not only to compel the defendant to enter the passwords to the devices, but also to compel the defendant to identify and produce the files located in the device in their unencrypted state. Id. The compelled act of identifying and producing files conveys far more information to the government than what the Commonwealth seeks in this case. See note 10, supra. The reference by the concurrence to the Third Circuit's decision in Apple MacPro Computer is similarly unavailing. As the concurrence acknowledges, although the Third Circuit did apply the concurrence's proposed standard in that case, it did so while reviewing the Federal District Court's application of the standard for plain error and expressly stated that "[i]t is important to note that we are not concluding that the Government's knowledge of the content of the devices is necessarily the correct focus of the 'foregone conclusion' inquiry in the context of a compelled decryption order" (emphasis added). Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d at 248 n.7. The court went on to note that "a very sound argument can be made that the foregone conclusion doctrine properly focuses on whether the Government already knows the testimony that is

1. First reported question: burden of proof in a Gelfgatt motion. The first question reported to us by the single justice is one left unanswered in Gelfgatt: "What is the burden of proof that the Commonwealth bears in [a Gelfgatt motion] in order to establish a foregone conclusion . . . ?"

a. Burden of proof under the Fifth Amendment. Although several State and Federal courts have applied the foregone conclusion exception in the context of compelled decryption, apparently only one court has meaningfully articulated the standard of proof the government bears to establish that a defendant's knowledge of the password to decrypt an electronic device is a foregone conclusion under the Fifth Amendment. United States vs. Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 26, 2018). In the Spencer decision, the court concluded that the appropriate standard of proof under the Fifth Amendment is clear and convincing evidence. Id. In so doing, the court explained that this standard places "a high burden on the government to demonstrate that the defendant's ability to decrypt the device at issue is a foregone conclusion." Id. The court noted that a high burden was necessary given the "Fifth Amendment's otherwise jealous protection of the privilege

implicit in the act of production. In this case, the fact known to the government that is implicit in the act of providing the password for the devices is 'I, [the defendant], know the password for these devices.'" Id.

against giving self-incriminating testimony." Id. The Commonwealth argues that this standard of proof should apply to Gelfgatt motions.¹²

The parties have not identified, and we have not found, a United States Supreme Court case -- in Fisher or any subsequent cases -- or any United States Court of Appeals case that has specifically addressed these issues. We need not speculate what the United States Supreme Court would decide is the appropriate standard of proof under the Fifth Amendment, however, as we conclude that art. 12 requires the Commonwealth to prove that a defendant knows the password to decrypt an electronic device beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception to apply. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) ("Of course, the States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard [of proof]. They may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake").

b. Burden of proof under art. 12. The adoption of a standard of proof "represents an attempt to instruct the fact

¹² Professor Orin Kerr, as amicus curiae, argues in favor of imposing the clear and convincing evidence standard under the Fifth Amendment as well, advocating that the standard is both "consistent with the Supreme Court decision" in Fisher "that established the foregone conclusion doctrine," and "a fair approximation of [the] burden needed to eliminate" the prosecutorial advantage that can be obtained from compelling testimonial acts of production. He takes no position, however, on the appropriate standard under art. 12.

finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of [his or her] factual conclusions.'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 309 (2015), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In criminal cases, we require the Commonwealth to prove all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, while generally requiring that other preliminary factual questions related to the admission of evidence be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 432 (2012) (admission of out-of-court statements of coventurers); Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 124, 126-127 & n.4 (2000) (admission of prior bad acts). We have held, however, that some critical facts implicating a defendant's constitutional rights require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, we have held that the Commonwealth must prove the voluntariness of a defendant's confession beyond a reasonable doubt before the confession may be placed before a jury. Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 152, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982). Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Day, 387 Mass. 915, 921 (1983), we held that the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant's waiver of his or her Miranda rights was made knowingly and intelligently beyond a reasonable doubt. In both circumstances, we concluded that the

standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt -- the highest standard considered by courts in their function as fact finders -- was necessary to protect the defendant's rights at issue.

In determining the reach of art. 12's protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, we also are attentive to the difference in wording of art. 12 from the Fifth Amendment. Article 12 protects a defendant from being compelled to "furnish evidence" against himself or herself, as opposed to becoming "a witness against" himself or herself. Based in part on this textual difference, we have "consistently held that art. 12 requires a broader interpretation [of the right against self-incrimination] than that of the Fifth Amendment."¹³ Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1210 (1992), quoting Attorney Gen. v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 796 (1982). See Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 525, 526 (art. 12 "demands a more expansive protection" but nonetheless recognizing the foregone conclusion exception itself and much of its "analytical" structure [citation omitted]); Burgess, 426 Mass. at 218 ("Although art. 12 demands a more expansive protection, it does not change the classification of evidence to which the privilege applies. Only that genre of evidence having a testimonial or communicative nature is

¹³ Indeed, the Fifth Amendment requires the voluntariness of a confession and the waiver of Miranda rights to be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-169 (1986).

protected under the privilege against self-incrimination"
[quotations and citation omitted]). Accordingly, this court has
remained vigilant to safeguard against governmental conduct that
could infringe upon this privilege under art. 12.

With these considerations in mind, we conclude that when
the Commonwealth seeks a Gelfgatt order compelling a defendant
to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, art. 12
requires that, for the foregone conclusion to apply, the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant knows the password.¹⁴ Whatever the standard under the

¹⁴ The motion judge required the Commonwealth to prove the
defendant's knowledge of the password, and the existence of
information relevant to the charges against the defendant within
the LG phone, with "reasonable particularity." This standard
has been used to define the level of particularity required in
the identification of subpoenaed documents. See, e.g., Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1349 ("We find no support in the record
for the conclusion that the Government, at the time it sought to
compel production [of the subpoenaed electronic files], knew to
any degree of particularity what, if anything, was hidden behind
the encrypted wall"). Here, neither documents nor the contents
of the LG phone are sought. As we explained supra, the
Commonwealth therefore need not prove any facts with respect to
the contents of the LG Phone. The only consideration is whether
the defendant knows the password to the encrypted device. The
reasonable particularity standard, which considers the level of
specificity with which the Commonwealth must describe sought
after evidence, is therefore inapt in the context of compelled
decryption. Indeed, as other courts have noted, the defendant
either knows the password or does not. His knowledge therefore
must be proved to a level of certainty, not described with a
level of specificity. See Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-
00259-CRB-1 ("While physical evidence may be described with more
or less specificity . . . a defendant's ability to decrypt is
not subject to the same sliding scale. He [or she] is either
able to do so, or he [or she] is not. Accordingly, the

Fifth Amendment may be, requiring the Commonwealth to bear this high burden is necessary to ensure that the art. 12 rights of defendants are adequately protected, and reflects our recognition that a "person's right to be free from self-incrimination is a fundamental principle of our system of justice," and that we have imposed even higher standards than the Fifth Amendment to protect that right. Borans, 388 Mass. at 455. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) ("The standard [of proof] serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision"); Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 841-842 (2013) (under art. 12, witness may not be compelled to testify unless "it is perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case . . . that the [testimony] cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate" [citation omitted]). See also Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. at 1210 (discussing broader protections afforded under art. 12).

Most critically, the imposition of this burden is also necessary to respect the meaning and purpose of the foregone

reasonable particularity standard cannot apply to a defendant's ability to decrypt a device"). We need not address how the reasonable particularity standard combines with the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement in document production cases, as no such content has been sought in this case.

conclusion exception. Indeed, as its very name suggests, the government must be certain that the facts conveyed by a compelled act of production are already known before it can properly be considered a foregone conclusion. See Black's Law Dictionary 762 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "foregone conclusion" as "[an] inevitable result; a foreordained eventuality"). The term, as it is used in this legal context, draws its roots from the Supreme Court's decision in Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. There, the Court held that the production of tax documents prepared by an accountant was not protected by the Fifth Amendment because the existence and location of the documents were already known to the government and were thus "a foregone conclusion." Id. Their disclosure therefore "add[ed] little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information." Id. Although in Fisher the Court neither defined the term "foregone conclusion" nor articulated the standard of proof, the Court's discussion suggests that the government must have a high level of certainty that the defendant's act of production will not reveal any factual information beyond what it already knows for the exception to apply. See id. at 410-411. Indeed, in reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that it was "confident" that the disclosure would not violate the Fifth Amendment because "[s]urely the Government [wa]s in no way relying on the

'truthtelling' of the [defendant] to prove the existence of or his access to the documents" (emphasis added). Id. at 410, 411.

Our cases addressing the foregone conclusion exception also suggest holding the Commonwealth to a high standard of proof. For example, in Gelfgatt, where the Commonwealth sought to compel the defendant to decrypt several computers, we concluded that the exception applied because the defendant had already admitted to investigators that he had the ability to decrypt the seized computers. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 524. In that circumstance, the Commonwealth conclusively knew that the defendant knew the password, and therefore, his knowledge was a foregone conclusion. Id. By contrast, we concluded in Commonwealth v. Hughes, 380 Mass. 583, 592, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980), that the exception did not apply where the Commonwealth sought to compel the defendant to produce a firearm that the Commonwealth suspected had been used in an assault. The defendant was known only to have registered a firearm; he had not reported its sale or transfer, and a search of the defendant's car had not resulted in its discovery. Id. at 584, 585. We noted that production of the firearm was far from being a "foregone conclusion":

"If the defendant should produce the [firearm], he would be making implicitly a statement about its existence, location and control [that] would deal with just those matters about which the Commonwealth desires but does not have solid information. . . . [T]he Commonwealth is

seeking to be relieved of its ignorance or uncertainty by trying to get itself informed of knowledge the defendant possesses" (quotations and citations omitted).

Id. at 592. Because the production of the firearm would have conveyed facts not already known to the Commonwealth, we did not permit the Commonwealth to compel its production under the Fifth Amendment and art. 12. Id.

These decisions make clear that the Commonwealth must be certain that the compelled act of production will not implicitly convey facts not otherwise known to the Commonwealth. Accordingly, we conclude that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard burdens the Commonwealth with the appropriate level of certainty to prove the fact of a defendant's knowledge of the password to an encrypted electronic device to be a foregone conclusion under art. 12. To require anything less would defeat the meaning and purpose of the exception.

The Commonwealth argues that the privilege against self-incrimination can be adequately protected by the clear and convincing evidence standard. We disagree. Permitting the Commonwealth to prove a defendant's knowledge of the password to an encrypted electronic device by a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt creates a greater risk of incorrectly imputing knowledge to those defendants who truly do not know the password. Such an error would bring steep consequences. Indeed, beyond the fact that an error would directly violate the

defendant's art. 12 rights, the practical consequence of the erroneous imputation of knowledge would be the issuance of a Gelfgatt order with which the defendant could not possibly comply. The defendant's inevitable failure to comply would likely then lead to a finding of civil or criminal contempt potentially resulting in incarceration. See, e.g., United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018) (reviewing defendant's appeal from contempt order after defendant found in contempt for refusing order to decrypt electronic device). The increased risk of error brought on by a lower standard of proof is not one that we are willing to endorse here.

2. Second reported question: application to this case.

We turn now to the second reported question: whether the Commonwealth met its burden in this case. We conclude that the factual record put before the motion judge by the Commonwealth in its initial Gelfgatt motion and its renewed motion¹⁵ contained sufficient evidence for the Commonwealth to meet its evidentiary burden.

¹⁵ The additional information included in the renewed motion should have been considered by the motion judge. See part 3, infra. We therefore consider it in evaluating whether the Commonwealth met its burden.

At the start of the investigation of the defendant, Sara made statements to police tending to show the defendant's regular use of the LG phone. Sara stated that she would speak directly with the defendant by calling the LG phone and that she also communicated with him by exchanging text messages with the LG phone. She also explained that the defendant would regularly respond to customer text messages by using the LG phone. Additionally, an examination of Sara's phone revealed that the LG phone's telephone number was listed in the contacts section of her phone as "[]Dennis," creating the reasonable inference that, at the very least, Sara understood that the defendant could be reached by contacting the LG phone.¹⁶

The record also reveals that the LG phone was in the defendant's possession at the time he was arrested by police. Indeed, it was recovered from his front pants pocket. Additionally, the motion judge acknowledged that the record revealed that the defendant had characterized the telephone number of the LG phone as his telephone number to police while he was being booked following an arrest in an unrelated criminal matter approximately one month before he was arrested in this

¹⁶ The motion judge, without explanation, appears to have declined to consider Sara's statements related to the connection between the defendant and the LG phone, concluding that he could not "put much stock in the statements of the complaining witness."

case. Subscriber information for the LG phone also revealed that the LG phone subscriber had listed a "backup" telephone number. Police records pertaining to this backup telephone number showed that it belonged to a "Dennis Jones" with the same Social Security number and date of birth as the defendant. Finally, the LG phone's CSLI records revealed that at various times, the LG phone was in the same location at the same time as another cell phone that was confirmed to be the defendant's phone. The CSLI records also revealed that the phone calls were made from the LG phone when that phone was confirmed to be miles away from the female associate who assisted the defendant in conducting prostitution (and who had her own personal phone). These facts undoubtedly create the reasonable inference that the defendant regularly used the LG phone and that he therefore knew its password.

The defendant principally argues that his knowledge of the password is not a foregone conclusion because the Commonwealth has failed to prove that he had sole ownership and control of the LG phone. Specifically, the defendant points to evidence in the record showing that the LG phone was used by more than one person and to CSLI records confirming that, at various times, the LG phone and the defendant were in different locations.

Although proof of ownership or exclusive control of the LG phone would certainly further support the Commonwealth's

argument, we explained supra that the Commonwealth is only required to establish the defendant's knowledge of the password beyond a reasonable doubt, not his ownership or exclusive control of the LG phone. That multiple people may have used the LG phone and therefore may know its password does not disprove the defendant's knowledge of the password; exclusive control of the phone is not required. This is especially so in light of Sara's characterization of the LG phone as the defendant's business phone that was used by both the defendant and a female associate to arrange and direct prostitution transactions -- a characterization that was corroborated by the record.¹⁷

The defendant's possession of the phone at the time of his arrest, his prior statement to police characterizing the LG phone's telephone number as his telephone number, the LG phone's subscriber information and CSLI records, and Sara's statements that she communicated with the defendant by contacting the LG phone, taken together with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

¹⁷ The record revealed several communications between Sara's phone and the LG phone related to prostitution, including screenshots of customer communications in response to online advertisements for prostitutions transactions with Sara; messages from the LG phone explicitly instructing Sara on how to perform sexual acts on customers; and several Internet postings on the website Backpage.com advertising Sara as an escort and listing the LG phone's telephone number as the principal point of contact.

knows the password to the LG phone. Indeed, short of a direct admission, or an observation of the defendant entering the password himself and seeing the phone unlock, it is hard to imagine more conclusive evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the LG phone's password. The defendant's knowledge of the password is therefore a foregone conclusion and not subject to the protections of the Fifth Amendment and art. 12. The motion judge's denial of the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion is therefore reversed.

3. Third reported question: consideration of additional information. The third and final reported question asks us whether a judge may consider additional information included in a renewed Gelfgatt motion only after first finding that the additional information was not known or reasonably available to the Commonwealth at the time the earlier Gelfgatt motion was filed.

We consider first the legal question posed in the reported question. "Upon a showing that substantial justice requires, the judge . . . may permit a pretrial motion which has been heard and denied to be renewed." Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (5), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004). Substantial justice may require consideration of a renewed motion in a number of circumstances, including where the renewed motion contains "new or additional grounds . . . which could not reasonably have been

known when the motion was originally filed." Reporters' Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (Revised, 2004), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1597 (LexisNexis 2018). It is well established, however, that the power of a judge to consider a renewed motion "is not restricted to those circumstances" where new facts have been raised. Commonwealth v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 792 (2003). This is particularly true, we conclude, in the context of Gelfgatt motions, which arise in the course of ongoing investigations, often at early stages of such investigations, where the facts are still being investigated and developed.

Accordingly, we answer the third reported question as follows: a judge acting on a renewed Gelfgatt motion may consider additional information without first finding that it was not known or not reasonably available at the time of the first filing.

We turn now to whether the motion judge abused his discretion in this case. See Haskell, 438 Mass. at 792. A judge's decision will be found to be an abuse of discretion only where it contains an error of law or "where we conclude the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotations and citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185

n.27 (2014). We conclude that the motion judge's decision that he "was not inclined to" consider the additional factual information supporting the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion without first finding that it was not known or reasonably available at the time of the first filing was incorrect and based on a mistaken analogy to motions to suppress, where we have imposed tighter constraints on renewed filings. We believe that Gelfgatt motions are more aptly compared to search warrant applications, which can be renewed without similar constraints.

Our conclusion is informed by the particular qualities of a Gelfgatt motion. Much like a search warrant application, a Gelfgatt motion is an investigatory tool that aids investigators in obtaining material and relevant evidence related to a defendant's conduct. Indeed, the purpose of a Gelfgatt motion is to enable the Commonwealth to gain access to an encrypted electronic device, thereby allowing it to further its investigation of a defendant. As a result, one might reasonably expect that some relevant existing facts might be overlooked or missed by investigators when an initial Gelfgatt motion is filed, especially when such a motion is filed early on in an investigation.

We do not consider the judge's apparent analogizing of Gelfgatt motions to motions to suppress to be an apt comparison, as the validity of motions to suppress are based upon the

information known at the time of the challenged government conduct. The factual record before the court is therefore a much more fixed target than the one at issue in a Gelfgatt motion; a motion which, as explained supra, is directed at obtaining information necessary for an ongoing investigation, and is informed by that investigation. For example, in reviewing a defendant's motion to suppress that challenges whether there was sufficient probable cause to authorize a search warrant, the reviewing judge is limited to reviewing the four corners of the affidavit in support of a warrant application to determine whether probable cause existed. Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 298 (2003) ("The magistrate considers . . . whether the facts presented in the affidavit and the reasonable inferences therefrom constitute probable cause. That conclusion of law is neither buttressed nor diminished by other evidence"). Motions to suppress challenging other evidence must likewise be based on what the police knew at the time of the search. What the police learned later in their investigation is irrelevant to a motion to suppress.¹⁸

¹⁸ We recognize that a defendant may learn through discovery more about what the police knew at the time of the search, thereby justifying a renewed motion to suppress, but this is still a more fixed, time defined inquiry than one connected to an ongoing criminal investigation.

Given the different nature and purpose of a Gelfgatt motion, the motion judge committed an error of law by imposing the tighter constraints required for renewed motions to suppress. The Commonwealth should not have been barred from renewing its initial Gelfgatt motion simply because it failed to ascertain all available facts bearing on a defendant's knowledge of the password to an encrypted device at the time it filed its first Gelfgatt motions. As is allowed for subsequent search warrant applications, the Commonwealth should have been permitted to renew its Gelfgatt motion upon the further development of the factual record of the case. This is especially so in light of our holding today that the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's knowledge of the password beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard of proof is rigorous, and the Commonwealth may use a renewed motion to bring additional factual information that it may have missed in preparing its initial motion to the reviewing court's attention in an attempt to meet this burden. Cf. United States v. Greenfield, 831 F.3d 106, 128 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting, after finding that defendant could not be compelled to produce bank records under foregone conclusion exception, that "we do not . . . foreclose the possibility that the Government could develop a better record with respect to each of the relevant requirements in connection with the issuance of another summons

in the future. Indeed, it is precisely because of this possibility that we have examined in such detail what is lacking in the present Summons").

This is not to say that courts are required to consider renewed Gelfgatt motions under every circumstance. Incomplete, careless, repetitive, or tardy police or prosecution work need not be tolerated. Decisions concerning whether to consider renewed motions remain in the sound discretion of the motion judge, and will depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. A judge may not, however, decline to consider a renewed motion simply because the additional factual information contained in the renewed motion was either known or reasonably available to the Commonwealth at the time the Gelfgatt motion was first filed.

In this case, the renewed filing should have been considered and allowed. Indeed, the Commonwealth had reasonable grounds to believe that its initial motion as filed was sufficient to prove that the defendant's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion. The original motion included critical facts bearing on the defendant's knowledge of the password to the LG phone, including the fact that the LG phone was found in his possession at the time of his arrest and the victim's detailed description of the defendant's use of the LG phone. These facts created a strong inference that the

defendant knew the LG phone's password. We understand, however, that the novelty of the question and the relative uncertainty of the proper legal standard in the compelled decryption context made this initial motion difficult for both the judge and the parties. The additional factual information included in the renewed motion, however, certainly resolved any reasonable remaining doubts that may have existed in the initial motion. Although some, if not all, of the additional information included in its renewed motion may very well have been available to the Commonwealth at the time it filed its initial motion, in light of the nature and purpose of Gelfgatt motions and the circumstances of this case, the judge erred in concluding that he need not consider the additional information "[a]bsent a showing of new evidence not otherwise available to the Commonwealth." The motion judge therefore abused his discretion in denying the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion.

Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, the motion judge's denial of the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order compelling the defendant to enter the password into the cell phone at issue.

So ordered.

LENK, J. (concurring). I write separately because, unlike the court, I think that compelled decryption of a cellular telephone or comparable device implicates more than just its passcode; what the government seeks is access to the files on the device, which the government believes will aid in inculcating the defendant. Given that the foregone conclusion doctrine is a narrow exception to the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the government may compel a defendant's decryption of such a device only when it can show that any testimonial aspect involved in that act of production is already known to the government. In other words, the government must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused knows the passcode to the device and that the government already knows, with reasonable particularity, the existence and location of relevant, incriminating evidence it expects to find on that device. Because here the government met these requirements, I concur in the result. I also agree with the court that the appropriate standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the judge should have allowed the Commonwealth to present new evidence in an additional motion to compel.

Act of producing files. "A person's right to be free from self-incrimination is a fundamental principle of our system of justice," secured both by art. 12 of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 455 (1983). The constitutional privilege, however, applies only when an accused is "compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating" (emphasis omitted). See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). The United States Supreme Court has long held that, in some instances, the act of producing evidence can be an incriminating, testimonial communication because an accused "tacitly concedes" the existence, custody, and authenticity of the evidence. See Fisher, supra at 410. When such is the case, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is implicated. Id.

The "foregone conclusion" doctrine, first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Fisher, and relied upon in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 526 (2014), provides a narrow exception to the otherwise uncompromising privilege against self-incrimination. Under the Fifth Amendment and art. 12, the exception applies only where any testimonial aspects inherent in the act of producing evidence are a "foregone conclusion" already known to the government. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; Gelfgatt, supra. That is, where the government demonstrates its prior knowledge of the "existence and location of the papers" it seeks to compel, the accused

"adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he [or she] in fact has the papers." Fisher, supra at 411. Under such circumstances, an accused's Fifth Amendment privilege is not implicated, as "[t]he question is not of testimony but of surrender." Id. at 411.

Compelled decryption. Although these Fifth Amendment doctrines find their provenance in cases involving subpoenaed paper documents, courts since have applied their underlying principles to electronic documents in the context of compelled decryption. See, e.g., United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012) (In re Grand Jury Subpoena); In re Boucher, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 2:06-MJ-91(D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). Indeed, in Gelfgatt, we held that, for the foregone conclusion exception to apply to an order compelling decryption of a device, "the government must establish its knowledge of (1) the existence of the evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of that evidence by the defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the evidence." See Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 522, citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-413; United States v. Bright, 596 F.3d 683, 692 (9th Cir. 2010); and United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 40-41, 44-45 (2000). That is, by entering a passcode to provide the government with

unencrypted access to a device, "the defendant implicitly would be acknowledging that he has ownership and control of the [devices] and their contents." See Gelfgatt, supra at 522. Unless the government demonstrates that such information already is a foregone conclusion, the Fifth Amendment protection bars it from compelling an accused to provide it. See id. at 522-523.

For the foregone conclusion exception to apply, the government also "must be able to 'describe with reasonable particularity' the documents or evidence it seeks to compel." Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d at 247, quoting Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 29-30. Although the government is not required to name every document it seeks or what its contents contain, it must demonstrate, with reasonable particularity, the existence and location of some incriminating files it expects to find on the device. See, e.g., Matter of the Decryption of a Seized Data Storage Sys., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2013) (government must demonstrate its "knowledge of the existence, possession, and authenticity of the files on the encrypted storage devices with reasonable particularity"); United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012) (Fifth Amendment not implicated by requiring production of unencrypted contents of computer "where government kn[ew] of existence and location of the computer's files," although not

specific content of documents, and knew of defendant's custody and control of device).¹

¹ The Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and their relationship to each other in the criminal context have long been understood in different ways by judges and legal scholars. See generally Sacharoff, *Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices*, 87 *Fordham L. Rev.* 203, 246-247 (2018). See also *Carpenter v. United States*, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2271 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that "there is substantial evidence that the [Fifth Amendment's] privilege against self-incrimination was also originally understood to protect a person from being forced to turn over potentially incriminating evidence" [citations omitted]). It is not surprising, then, that the court and I would have different views on these much debated issues. This is especially so as we are called upon to meet the challenges emerging from encrypted devices seized by the government with a valid search warrant, which devices the government seeks to compel an individual to decrypt. My view is that the coequal amendments do not dwell in splendid isolation, and that the Fourth Amendment does not somehow limit or trump the Fifth Amendment whenever there may be a valid search warrant. As a result, it will no longer do to cower in the presence of a search warrant, but to attempt to reconcile the Fourth Amendment's authorization of the government's taking of evidence with the Fifth Amendment's limitations on its requiring an individual to produce it. See Sacharoff, *supra* at 208 (suggesting rule that "a court may compel a suspect to decrypt only those files that (1) the government already knows the person possesses, and (2) the government can describe with reasonably particularity. Once the government has identified the specific files, it may compel the defendant to decrypt only those files"). Other courts have adopted or applied rules that may be seen as effecting something of a reconciliation. See e.g., *In re Grand Jury Subpoena*, 670 F.3d at 1344 ; *Apple MacPro Computer*, 851 F.3d at 247-248; *Matter of the Decryption of a Seized Data Storage Sys.*, U.S. Dist. Ct., slip op. Contrast *United States vs. Spencer*, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 26, 2018). In any event, what is before us is not the propriety of the rather broad search warrant here, but the constraints imposed by the Fifth Amendment. My reading of what the cases require recognizes those constraints and gives them meaningful teeth.

Indeed, those United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed these issues in the context of compelled decryption have recognized that the foregone conclusion doctrine requires a showing, with reasonable particularity, as to the existence and location of incriminating files on a device.² See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346 (applying reasonable particularity in context of compelled decryption); Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d at 247 (same). See also Matter of M.W., Ohio Ct. App., No. 2018CA0021 (Dec. 21, 2018) (same). For example, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, supra, involved the lawful taking of an accused's digital devices pursuant to a search warrant; a subpoena duces tecum subsequently issued to compel the accused to unlock the devices because law enforcement could not do so. Id. at 1139. There, the court held that, before the government could compel an accused to unlock the device and produce access to the files contained therein, the government had to demonstrate, with reasonable particularity, its awareness that incriminating files exist and are located on those devices, and that the defendant has the ability to unlock and produce them.

² As discussed, I do not contend that the contents of the files contained on the phone are protected by the Fifth Amendment, or are the focus of the foregone conclusion inquiry in the context of the compelled decryption of the device itself.

Id. at 1349.³ And if this is what the Fifth Amendment requires, well, art. 12 demands even more. See Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 525, quoting Commonwealth v. Burgess, 426 Mass. 206, 218 (1997) (we have consistently held that art. 12 provides broader "protection against self-incrimination than does the Fifth Amendment" and provides greater protection). In fact, art. 12 provides that no subject shall be compelled to "furnish evidence against himself" (emphasis added). See Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 534 (2017), citing Gelfgatt, supra at 523 (Commonwealth need not establish knowledge of specific contents of device, but is required "to demonstrate knowledge of the existence and the location of the content"). The court's departure from this constitutional doctrine is thus, in my view, imprudent, particularly in light

³ Likewise, Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d at 241, concerned the government's "ability to compel the decryption of digital devices when the government seizes those devices pursuant to a valid search warrant." There, the court noted that "the Government has provided evidence to show both [1] that files exist on the encrypted portions of the devices and [2] that [the accused] can access them." Id. at 248. Because the government demonstrated those two things, the court concluded that the magistrate judge did not err in determining "that any testimonial component would be a foregone conclusion." Id. Although the court applied the foregone conclusion and reasonable particularity doctrines to those facts, it also acknowledged that it "need not decide . . . that the inquiry can be limited to the question of whether [the accused's] knowledge of the password itself is sufficient to support application of the foregone conclusion doctrine," but that a sound argument could be made in support of such a position. See id. at 248 n.7.

of the vast amount of potentially incriminating information at risk.⁴

Because the Commonwealth here has demonstrated its prior knowledge of the existence and location of specific files contained on the LG telephone, however, I conclude that it has met its burdens. More specifically, the government made plain its knowledge of (1) specific text messages, sent from the LG telephone, related to illegal, commercial sex acts; (2) several online advertisements for commercial sex services that featured the woman's image, posted by the LG telephone, on specified dates; (3) particular text messages sent to the alleged victim from the LG telephone; (4) precise dates for CSLI location information for the LG telephone that corresponded to the location of the defendant and the locations where some of the sex services were provided; (5) distinct "screenshot" photographs of conversations with clients from the LG telephone; and (6) records of a hotel reservation, where the defendant was arrested, using the LG telephone's number and the defendant's

⁴ Permitting the government to undertake a "quintessential fishing expedition" by ordering an individual to enter a passcode and to provide the government with unlimited, unencrypted access to a personal electronic device is precisely the sort of act against which the Fifth Amendment was designed to guard. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 32, 34 n.8, quoting United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D. D.C. 1998) (privilege against self-incrimination, in part, was structured to prevent government from "uncover[ing] uncharged offenses"). See generally Sacharoff, supra at 246-247.

electronic mail address. Such a comprehensive showing of the government's prior knowledge of these particularized files on the LG telephone compels the conclusion that the Commonwealth has met its burden in this instance.

Conclusion. The court's decision today sounds the death knell for a constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination in the digital age. After today's decision, before the government may order an individual to provide it with unencrypted access to a trove of potential incriminating and highly personal data on an electronic device, all that the government must demonstrate is that the accused knows the device's passcode. This is not a difficult endeavor, and in my judgment, the Fifth Amendment and art. 12 demand more. That is, before the government may compel an accused's assistance in building a case against that accused, the government must demonstrate that it already knows, with reasonable particularity, of files on the device relevant to the offenses charged, and that the defendant knows the passcode to unlock them. Because I conclude that the government here met those burdens, I join in the court's result.

Appendix B

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

MIDDLESEX, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
Docket No. 17-49

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

DENNIS LEE JONES

**MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON COMMONWEALTH'S
MOTIONS (1) FOR PRODUCTION OF A PIN ACCESS CODE,
AND (2) TO REOPEN EVIDENCE OR FOR RECONSIDERATION**

Defendant Dennis Lee Jones is charged with trafficking a person for sexual servitude in violation of G.L. c. 265, § 50(a), and deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute in violation of G.L. c. 272, § 7. On June 26, 2017, I held a hearing and took under advisement the Commonwealth's Motion for an Order Requiring Production of a PIN (Personal Identification Number) Access Code (Docket #14) to unlock a cellular telephone under Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt ("Gelfgatt"), 468 Mass. 512 (2014). The next day, the Commonwealth filed a Motion to Reopen Evidence in Motion Hearing to Compel Defendant to Produce PIN Code for Cellular Telephone Seized Pursuant to Search Warrant or/in the Alternative Request for Reconsideration Upon Denial of Commonwealth's Motion to Compel (Docket #17)¹ seeking to file an affidavit by Woburn Police Sgt. Det. Brian McManus.² After further hearing on July 19, 2017, the motion to reopen is **ALLOWED** and the motion to compel is **DENIED**.

¹ To the extent the Commonwealth sought "reconsideration," it was premature because I had not yet decided the Gelfgatt motion, although the Commonwealth did not know how quickly I might have decided the issue.

² The documents before me refer to Mr. McManus as Sergeant Detective and also as Detective Sergeant. For consistency, I refer to him herein as "Sgt. Det. McManus."

#21

I. The Motion to Reopen

The trial court has considerable discretion to determine whether to permit additional evidence after a hearing and even after a motion has been decided. See, e.g., Mass. R. Crim. P. 13(a)(5) (where “substantial justice requires, the judge . . . may permit a pretrial motion which has been heard and denied to be renewed”); Commonwealth v. Pagan, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 374-375 (2008). It is in the interest of substantial justice that the issue presented in the Gelfgatt motion be decided on the most complete and accurate record available. The motion raises an important question about whether the Commonwealth will be able to access potentially relevant information from a cellular telephone believed to belong to defendant. Even if I were to decide the question on the factual record as it existed on June 26, 2017, nothing would prevent the Commonwealth from seeking to renew its motion in the interest of “substantial justice.”

Defendant has not demonstrated that he will be prejudiced if I were to consider the additional information. None of the material additional information was new to the defendant. Defendant has had an opportunity to address the Commonwealth’s additional factual submission both by a responsive factual submission and orally. With Defendant’s Opposition to Commonwealth’s Motion to Re-Open Evidence and/or Motion for Reconsideration (July 18, 2017), defendant filed a series of documents which go beyond the materials previously submitted. At the hearing on July 19, 2017, the Commonwealth presented an affidavit by Det. Mark Shaughnessy, which responded to one of the arguments advanced by defendant and which defendant had the opportunity to address at argument.

I find that defendant has not shown prejudice from the Commonwealth’s late factual submissions and that substantial justice compels me to consider the Gelfgatt motion on the fullest possible record. I therefore allow the Commonwealth’s motion to reopen and will consider the

new affidavit from Sgt. Det. McManus, the additional factual materials attached to defendant's opposition to the motion to reopen, and the affidavit of Det. Shaughnessy filed on July 19, 2017.

II. The Motion to Compel under *Gelfgatt*

A. Factual Background

This case resulted from a short police investigation. On December 20, 2016, the Woburn Police received a call for a stolen purse at the Red Roof Inn in Woburn. When they responded, V [REDACTED] a F [REDACTED] ("F [REDACTED]") reported that defendant had stolen her purse, had left in a black Nissan, and had been using the Nissan to transport her to different locations to engage in prostitution. She said she had known defendant since December 1, 2016 and communicated with him by phone and text message using telephone number 978-478-7119 ("the 7119 Number"), which she said was defendant's number. According to F [REDACTED], she was first in a dating relationship with defendant, but she soon lost her housing and defendant offered to provide housing if she worked as a prostitute. F [REDACTED] told the police about backpage.com ads displaying her and another woman, Shanaisha McNeill ("McNeill"), as escorts. These ads were "associated with" the 7119 Number and with [REDACTED]-0880, which F [REDACTED] said was her phone ("F [REDACTED]'s Phone").

Fortin said that the 7119 Number was used to conduct prostitution using the backpage.com ads. According to F [REDACTED], defendant would respond to customer text messages to the 7119 Number, but McNeill would answer as the female voice when voice calls would be received at the 7119 Number. The Commonwealth's affidavits do not indicate that F [REDACTED] told the police what type of phone was associated with the 7119 Number, described any physical

characteristics of the phone, or said she had witnessed defendant physically accessing the LG Phone or putting a PIN or other access code into the phone.³

The police examined F█████'s Phone. They observed several communications from the 7119 Number relating to prostitution, including "screenshots" of customer communications in response to backpage.com ads, messages trying to get F█████ to return to defendant, and messages in which defendant was apologizing for his behavior. F█████'s Phone listed the 7119 Number as associated with a contact labeled "Dennis." Sgt. Det. McManus located a number of different backpage.com ads that either used Fortin's Phone or the 7119 Number as the point of contact for F█████'s services.

Later on December 20, 2016, defendant contacted the Woburn police to arrange to return F█████'s purse. He called from telephone number 857-212-8631 ("the 8631 Number").

On December 21, 2016, defendant was arrested in the parking lot of the Red Roof Inn in Woburn. Two cellular telephones were recovered from Mr. Jones: a Kyocera phone with the 8631 Number, and an LG phone (the "LG Phone"). The LG Phone was found in the right pocket of Mr. Jones' pants.⁴ After the seizure, Sgt. Det. McManus was able to verify that the 7119 Number belonged to the LG Phone by dialing the 7119 Number and observing the LG Phone receive his incoming call. According to records from Verizon Wireless, there is no subscriber

³ After her report, the Woburn police did not arrest F█████ for prostitution or any other crimes, but referred her to a homeless shelter. She has been provided with written assurances that she will not be prosecuted. According to defense counsel, she also was not arrested on December 20, 2016 on a then-pending warrant out of the Chelsea District Court.

⁴ Det. Shaughnessy authored a supplemental narrative report regarding his role arresting defendant and searching his vehicle. His report makes no reference to recovering any telephones. Det. Shaughnessy asserts in his affidavit, however, that he located both phones and that the LG Phone was located in defendant's "right pants pocket."

name associated with the 7119 Number, which is registered to 71 Evans Street in Boston. This address is close to, but different from, defendant's address at 79 Evans Street in Boston.

Mr. Jones has not made any statements about his ownership or control of the LG Phone, the contents or use of that phone, whether the LG Phone is protected by a PIN or other access code, or whether he knows the PIN or access code to that phone.

On December 30, 2016, Sgt. Det. McManus applied for and was granted a search warrant to search the LG Phone for evidence of the crimes charged. The police were unable to execute the authorized search because the phone cannot be opened without a personal identification number ("PIN"). The Commonwealth now moves to compel defendant to provide a PIN for the LG Phone so that the search may be conducted.

B. The Merits

The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., Amend V. The protections of the Fifth Amendment apply to testimonial statements that may support a conviction, and to those "which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute" the defendant. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).

The law provides a limited opportunity for the government to compel information or testimony from a criminal defendant. The Supreme Judicial Court has summarized the applicable law as follows:

Although the Fifth Amendment privilege typically applies to oral or written statements that are deemed to be testimonial, . . . the act of producing evidence demanded by the government may have "communicative aspects" that would render the Fifth Amendment applicable. . . . Whether an act of production is testimonial depends on whether the government compels the individual to disclose "the contents of his own mind" to explicitly or implicitly communicate some statement of fact. . . . More

particularly, the act of complying with the government's demand could constitute a testimonial communication where it is considered to be a tacit admission to the existence of the evidence demanded, the possession or control of such evidence by the individual, and the authenticity of the evidence.

Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 520-521 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Even if the compelled production does force the accused to disclose a statement of fact, the sought-after information may lose its testimonial character and not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights if the information provided is a "foregone conclusion." Id. at 522.

"The 'foregone conclusion' exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination provides that an act of production does not involve testimonial communication where the facts conveyed already are known to the government, such that the individual 'adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information.'" Id. To establish the foregone conclusion exception, the Commonwealth bears the burden to show "its knowledge of (1) the existence of the evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of that evidence by the defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the evidence." Id. In short, where the Commonwealth's motion compels the defendant to tell "the government what it already knows," "[the motion] does not violate the defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 524. See generally United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43-45 (2000).

When the "foregone conclusion" exception has been applied, the government has been able to establish independently and with specificity the authenticity, existence, and possession of the compelled information. In Gelfgatt, the Commonwealth possessed "detailed evidence" of fraudulent mortgages linked to a financial services company. When he was arrested, defendant told police that he had communications with the financial services company on his computer and he had encrypted his computers for privacy and was able to decrypt them. 468 Mass. at 517.

Although the Court acknowledged that by entering an encryption key into his computers, “the defendant implicitly would be acknowledging that he has ownership and control of the computers and their contents,” “facts that would be relevant to the Commonwealth’s case,” *id.* at 522, the Court found that “the factual statements that would be conveyed” were a “foregone conclusion,” *id.* at 523, because “the defendant’s act of decryption would not communicate facts . . . beyond what the defendant already has admitted to investigators.” *Id.* at 519. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the fact that “[d]uring his postarrest interview” defendant admitted he had performed work for the financial services company, had communications with the company on his computer, and that his computers were encrypted, but that he could decrypt them.⁵ *Id.* at 523-524.

In this case, the Commonwealth has established with reasonable particularity that information relevant to the charges against Mr. Jones exists on the LG Phone, and that it is authentic, satisfying two of the three elements of the “foregone conclusion” analysis. For example, the 7119 Number is linked to the LG Phone; online listings for alleged prostitution reference the 7119 Number; and police have possession of text messages from the 7119 Number related to commercial sex acts. In short, the Commonwealth has established independently that information connected to the charged sex trafficking activity is on the LG Phone.

The Commonwealth, however, has not demonstrated with reasonable particularity that Mr. Jones possesses the PIN number for the LG Phone or has access to what that phone contains.

⁵ The majority in *Gelfgatt* did not address the standard of proof required to show that the existence, possession, and authenticity of the evidence sought is a foregone conclusion. The phrase “foregone conclusion” suggests a high level of certainty. Most courts have concluded that the showing must be made with “reasonable particularity.” See *Gelfgatt*, 468 Mass. at 531-532 (Lenk, J., dissenting) (and cases cited). But see *United States v. Fricosu*, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1234 (D. Colo. 2012) (applying “preponderance of the evidence” standard). The parties have not addressed the issue.

The phone is not registered to Mr. Jones or to his address. A female voice (McNeill's) answers voice calls to the 7119 Number. The Commonwealth has provided no evidence of Mr. Jones accessing or entering the PIN number into the LG Phone. The Commonwealth does not suggest that any law enforcement officer called the LG Phone and heard Mr. Jones answer the phone. In addition, Mr. Jones has not admitted to owning or controlling the phone. In short, the Commonwealth has offered no evidence akin to the strong evidence offered in Gelfgatt, where the defendant admitted to encrypting (and being able to decrypt) the computers at his home office.

The Commonwealth relies mainly on statements from Ms. F█████, who lists the 7119 Number in her phone's contact list as "Dennis," and claims the 7119 Number belongs to Mr. Jones. I have not seen a statement from Ms. F█████ that shows she witnessed Mr. Jones using the LG Phone, nor did she describe the physical characteristics of the phone (such as model, color, or general appearance) in a way to suggest she has seen Mr. Jones physically use or enter a PIN into the phone. Defendant challenges Ms. F█████'s credibility. The Commonwealth seems tacitly to acknowledge Ms. F█████'s credibility issues, indicating in its search warrant affidavit that it seeks access to the contents of the LG Phone to "corroborate or fail to corroborate" the "key aspects of Ms. F█████'s statement." Affidavit of Sgt. Det. McManus ¶ 45 (Dec. 30, 2016).

The fact that the LG Phone was found on Mr. Jones' person at the time of his arrest is notable and helpful to the Commonwealth, but insufficient. In many (perhaps nowadays most) cases, a cellular telephone is found on an individual at the time of his/her arrest. The mere fact of possession does not mean that the police *know* that the phone belongs to the individual arrested, or that the individual knows the decryption code to unlock any locked features on the phone. In seeking to compel Mr. Jones to provide the PIN for the LG Phone, the Commonwealth


is asking Mr. Jones to admit that he owns and/or controls the LG Phone, a fact the Commonwealth believes to be true, but does not know, and has been unable to establish independently. I cannot compel defendant to disclose or produce the PIN.

ORDER

The Commonwealth's Motion to Reopen Evidence in Motion Hearing to Compel Defendant to Produce PIN Code for Cellular Telephone Seized Pursuant to Search Warrant or/in the Alternative Request for Reconsideration Upon Denial of Commonwealth's Motion to Compel (Docket #17) is **ALLOWED** as to reopening and **DENIED as premature** at to reconsideration.

The Commonwealth's Motion for an Order Requiring Production of a PIN (Personal Identification Number) Access Code (Docket #14) is **DENIED**.

Dated: July 25, 2017


Peter B. Krupp
Justice of the Superior Court

Appendix C

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, ss.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY
No. SJ-2018-0221

Middlesex Superior Court
No.1781CR00049

COMMONWEALTH

v.


DENNIS JONES

JUDGMENT AFTER RESCRIPT

This matter came before the Court, and in accordance with the Rescript Opinion that was entered in the Full Court in SJC-12564 on March 6, 2019, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the following entry of Judgment be, and the same hereby is, made:

"The case is remanded to the county court for entry of a judgment reversing the motion judge's denial of the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion, and remanding the matter to the Superior Court for entry of an order compelling the defendant to enter the password into the cell phone at issue."

By the Court, (Kafker, J.) SLK


Maura S. Doyle, Clerk

May 10, 2019

ENTERED: